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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1326(b), authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency to compare costs with benefits in
determining the "best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact" at cooling
water intake structures.
(i)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the petitioners were Riverkeeper, Inc., Natural
Resources Defense Council, Waterkeeper Alliance,
Soundkeeper, Inc., Scenic Hudson, Inc., Save the Bay-
People for Narrangansett Bay, Friends of Casco Bay,
American Littoral Society, Delaware Riverkeeper
Network, Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc., New
York/New Jersey Baykeeper, Santa Monica Baykeeper,
San Diego Baykeeper, California Coastkeeper,
Columbia Riverkeeper, Conservation Law Foundation,
Surfrider Foundation, State of Rhode Island, State of
Connecticut, State of Delaware, Commonweal[th of
Massachusetts, State of New Jersey, State of New
York, Appalachian Power Co., Illinois Energy Ass’n,
Utility Water Act Group, Entergy Corp., and PSEG
Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC. The respondents
were the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Stephen L. Johnson, in his official
capacity as Administrator of EPA. Appalachian Power
Co. and the Illinois Energy Ass’n were petitioners
before the Second Circuit and are not parties in the
proceedings now before this Court.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 24.1 and 29.6,
there is no change in the corporate disclosure statement
previously filed by Riverkeeper, Inc., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Waterkeeper Alliance, Soundkeeper,
Inc., Scenic Hudson, Inc., Save the Bay- People for
Narrangansett Bay, Friends of Casco Bay, American
Littoral Society, Delaware Riverkeeper Network,
Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc., New York/New Jersey
Baykeeper, Santa Monica Baykeeper, San Diego
Baykeeper, California Coastkeeper, Columbia
Riverkeeper, Conservation Law Foundation, or
Surfrider Foundation.
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STATEMENT
This Court granted certiorari to consider "whether
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency to compare costs with
benefits in determining the ’best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact’ at cooling
water :intake structures." The statutory language of
Section 316(b) directly answers that question by
denying EPA the authority the Agency claims to
compare costs with benefits. The judgment of the court
of appeals should be affirmed.
A. Background
1. The Use of Cooling Water in the
Production of Power
The federal regulations challenged in this case
apply to power plant cooling water intake structures
that withdraw more than 50 million gallons of cooling
water !per day. Water has long served a central role in
the production of power because of its remarkable
physical and chemical characteristics.
During the nation’s early years, water mills
exploited the energy potential within water’s liquid flow.
1 Louis C. Hunter, A History o£Industrial Power in the
United StateB 1780-1930 1-3 (1979). With the
introduction of the steam engine in the middle of the
eighteenth century, however, water became a power
source based on its ability to convert from a liquid to a
gas and then to cool. 2 Louis C. Hunter, A HiBtory of
(1)
Industrial .power in the United States 1780-1930 2
(1985).
A steam engine produces power by raising the
temperature of liquid water sufficiently high to convert
it to a gas and then by using the pressure generated by
the gas in a confined space to produce mechanical power
- for instance, to drive a piston. The first steam engines
did not utilize water’s cooling capacity, but as early as
1698, a newly-designed steam engine was able to
produce greater power by spraying cooling waker to
condense the steam back to liquid water- the resulting
vacuum generated further pressure capable of
producing more power. See 2 Hunter, A History of
Industrial_Power, supra, at 1-2, 5-7, 671; see also Henry
C. Meyer, Jr., Steam .power Plants: Their Desig~ and
Construction, 142-43 (3d ed. 1912). The increased
demand by steam engines for water inevitably
generated conflicts between competing users of
waterways. See Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (1833);
Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon .pure Ice Co.,
251 F. 506 (7th Cir. 1918).
The steam engine’s design remains basically the
same today, whether the heat necessary to convert
water from a liquid to a gas is produced by fossil fuel
combustion or nuclear fission and whether the power
drives a piston or a turbine to produce electricity. See
M. M. Samuels, Power Unleashed." The Story of
Eleetrieity and Power, 222-24 (1943). What has
dramatically changed is the physical scale of power
plant operations and, accordingly, their environmental
impact. Today, a typical 500 megawatt coal-fired power
plant uses approximately 12 million gallons of cooling
water per hour, or approximately 300 million gallons
per day. For larger power plants, cooling ’water
consumption can be greater than three billion gallons
per day. In 2000, thermoelectric power plants used 136
billion gallons of fresh water per day, which represents
about 39 percent of the total withdrawal of fresh water
in the United States. See U.S. Department of Energy,
Addre~:sing the Critical Link Between Fossil Energy and
Water, 1-4 (2005). Thermoelectric power is also
currently the single largest source of withdrawal of total
water (fresh water and saline water) in the nation,
accounting for 47 percent of that total. Pet. App. 170a.1
The power plants covered just by the Phase II rule at
issue in this ease "withdraw more than 214 billion
gallons of cooling water a day from waters of the United
States." /d. at 169a-170a.
2. Cooling Water Intake Structures
and their Adverse Environmental
Impact
Because cooling water intake structures withdraw
such extraordinarily large amounts of water, their
withdrawals necessarily affect the full spectrum of
organisms in the aquatic ecosystem at all life stages.
Aquatic organisms are drawn into cooling water systems
where they are either "impinged" onto components of
the intake structure or "entrained" within the cooling
water system itself. Pet. App. 170a. Impingement
occurs when organisms are trapped against intake
screens by the force of the water being withdrawn into
the structure. [d. at 170a-171a. Entrainment happens
when aquatic organisms are instead drawn through the
cooling system. Entrained organisms are subject to
severe mechanical, thermal, and toxic stresses. Id. at
171a.
~ Citations to the Pet. App. refer to the appendix filed in No. 07-
588.
4As EPA has acknowledged, it is impossible to
quantify with any precision the nature and extent of the
adverse environmental impacts caused by the
withdrawal of approximately 80 trillion gallons of water
per year by cooling water intake structures. EPA has
nonetheless estimated, looking only to fish and shellfish
mortality caused by entrainment and impingement, that
the cooling water intake structures covered just by the
Phase II regulations at issue in this case cause the
death of more than 3.4 billion fish and shellfish each
year, expressed in terms of "age 1 equivalents.’’2 Id. at
168a-174a; see National Wildlife Federation Amicus Br.
I.A.1.
The harm caused by a cooling water intake
structure is most directly related to the amount of water
the structure withdraws, which largely turns on the
type of cooling system the facility utilizes. There are
generally two types of cooling systems: once-through
cooling systems and closed-cycle cooling systems (wet or
dry). As its name suggests, a once-through system
circulates the water through a condenser and then
returns the now-heated water to the water body from
which it was withdrawn. U.S. DOE, Addressing the
Critical Link, supra, at 3-4. A wet closed-cycle cooling
system uses wet cooling towers, ponds, or lakes to
dissipate the heat from the cooling water to the
atmosphere. Id. A dry cooling system uses air to cool
the exhaust steam. Id. The water use requirements of
these cooling systems vary significantly. On average, a
once-through system requires 37.7 gallons of water per
kilowatt hour of power produced. A wet closed-cycle
2 See Pet. App. 172a ("age 1 equivalents is an accepted method for
converting losses of all life stages into individuals of an equivalent
age").
cooling system, by contrast, uses only 1.2 gallons per
kilowatt hour produced. Id.
3.      The Clean Water Act3
a. The first reported congressional concern
regarding the environmental harm from power plants’
accelerating use of cooling water was in the 1960s. In
1967, Senator Warren Magnuson warned that "by 1980
thermal power plants throughout the Nation will
require an amount of cooling water greatly in excess of
the average flow of the mighty Mississippi at St. Louis."
113 Cong. Rec. 30129 (1967). Congress held extensive
hearings in 1968 and 1969 on the effects of waste heat
produced by industrial facilities, focusing on the adverse
environmental effects of thermal discharges, but also
considering the impact of cooling water intake.4 A 1968
White House report described how "the large volumes of
water withdrawn in once-through cooling processes" can
~ This brief offers an extensive discussion of the legislative
backgrou.nd leading up to Section 316(b)’s congressional enactment.
None is necessary for this Court’s resolution of the question
presentecl, which is answered by the statutory language’s plain
meaning without any resort to the legislative history. The
legislative history is entirely in keeping with that plain meaning
(see pp. 47-50, infra), and is provided only for the purpose of
refuting petitioners’ mischaracterizations of it.
4 See ThermalPollution. Hearings before the Subeomm. onAir and
Water of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., pts 1-4
(1968); kt. at 1 (statement of Sen. Muskie) ("[b]y the end of the next
decade, approximately one-sixth of the total fresh-water runoff in
the United States will be required for cooling and condensing
purposes."); id. at 98-102, 104, 112-13, 137-38, 143 (testimony on
intake impact on aquatic organisms); Environmental E£feets of
Produci~g Electric Power, Hearings before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energjz, 91st Cong., pt. 1, 341-45, 375-76 (1969) (intake
impact).
have "as much or more effect on aquatic life in a stream
than the waste discharges on which control measures
are required." See Office of Science and Technology of
the Executive Office of the President, Considerations
Affecting Steam Power Plant Site Selection, 46 (1968).
b. In 1972, "Congress, recognizing that ’the Federal
water pollution control program * * * ha[d] been
inadequate in every vital aspect * * *,’ passed the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Star. 816," now referred to as
the Clean Water Act. Milwaukee v. [llinois, 451
304, 310 (1981), quotingS. Rep. No. 92-414,7 (1971), 2
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 1452 (Committee Print compiled
for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the
Library of Congress), Set. No. 93-1 (1973) (hereinafter
"2 Leg. Hist."). The 1972 "Amendments were viewed by
Congress as a ’total restructuring’ and ’complete
rewriting’ of the existing water pollution legislation."
Id. at 317, quoting’House Debate on H.R. 11896, 1 Leg’.
Hist. 350-51, 359-60 (remarks of Reps. Blatnik and
Jones).
The single most important regulatory reform
achieved by the 1972 Act was the seemingly paradoxical
notion that the nation’s ambitious water quality goals
could best be achieved if they were no longer tied to
compliance with water quality standards. Congress
concluded that past efforts to maintain such a
regulatory link had failed because the science of water
ecology was too complex to measure the "tolerable
effects" with the precision necessary to have water
quality standards serve as the primary touchstone for
determining the appropriate level of control. EPA v.
California State Water Resources Control Board, 426
U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
The 1972 Act, accordingly, fundamentally
restructured the law to rely in the first instance on the
imposition of a series of categorically-determined
technology-based standards that did not themselves
depend on site-specific showings of impact of particular
activities on water quality. First promoted by Senator
Howard Baker and then embraced by Senator Edmund
Muskie,5 these technology-based standards were
designed to achieve the maximum reduction in activities
that degraded water quality, by focusing on the extent
to which certain technology was, depending on the type
of source or pollutant, "practicable," "achievable,"
"available" or "demonstrated." See Pub. L. 92-500, §§
301(b), 304(b), 306, 86 Stat. 844-45, 851, 854-56 (1972).
The new Act retained the prior approach of seeking
compliance with state water quality standards, but only
as a supplement to the controls first imposed by the
technology-based standards. See id. § 301(b)(1)(C);
EPA v. California State Water ResoureeB Control Board,
426 U.S. at 205 n.12.
c. Congress accomplished this major reform only
after t]~e House and Senate first passed sharply
different bills and met 39 times over six months to reach
an agreement. Statement of Sen. Muskie, 1 Leg. HiBt.
161. A central issue splitting the two chambers was the
extent to which Congress should delegate to EPA the
authority to consider and compare costs with benefits in
determi.ning the technology-based standards.
The Senate favored a technology-based approach
that did not depend on EPA’s assessment of the
associated water quality benefits of such control,
~ See Paul Milazzo, Unlikely Environmentalists - Congress and
Clean Water, 1945-1972, 214, 220-21 (2006).
including a comparison of control costs to benefits. The
Senate report accompanying its bill left no question why
such a fundamental shift was necessary: "the great
difficulty associated with establishing reliable and
enforceable precise effluent limitations on the basis of a
given stream quality. Water quality standards, in
addition to their deficiencies in relying on the
assimilative capacity of receiving waters, often cannot
be translated into effluent limitations * * * because of
the imprecision of models for water quality and the
effects of effluents in most waters." S. Rep. 92-414, 2
Le#. Hist. 1426.    "With effluent limits, the
Administrator can require the best control technology;
he need not search for a precise link between pollution
and water quality." Id.
The Senate version of the new law required existing
point sources of pollution to comply with two phases of
technology-based controls that would become
increasingly stringent over time: "In Phase I, to be
implemented by 1976, all industrial pollution sources
must apply the best practicable technology" ("BPT") and
"[i]n Phase II, to be implemented by 1981, * * *
industries will be required to apply, where the goal of
no-discharge cannot be attained, the best available
technology" ("BAT"). S. Rep. 92-414, 2 Leg. Hist. 1426.
Although for each, the "costs" of control was a factor to
be considered in determining the relevant technology-
based standard, whether BPT or BAT, there was no
allowance for any weighing by EPA of the costs and
benefits, consistent with the Senate’s decision to remove
any linkage between the technology-based standards
and a showing of water quality impacts. By contrast, for
new point sources, the applicable technology-based
standard in the Senate bill did allow for an exemption
from the categorically-determined technology-based best
9available control technology standard based on facility-
specific weighing of costs and benefits, but only for those
facilities that became subject to the standard for "new"
sources because of a modification of the facilities, S.
Rep. 92,-414, 2 Leg. Hist. 1475, 1477; see S. 2770, §
306(b)(1)(C), 2 Leg’. Hist. 1626-27.
d. The House and the Administration immediately
criticized the Senate for its rejection of water quality-
based regulation and its related elimination of cost-
benefit analysis from almost all aspects of technology-
based standards. The EPA Administrator complained
that because the Senate bill "eliminates over a period of
time the concept of water quality standards and instead
depends completely on effluent limitations based on the
best available technology or better. * * * Thus. the social
benefit we are all seeking - high quality water - is
eliminated from the equation and technology is
substituted in its place." Hearings on H.R. 11896, 2 Leg.
Hist. 1].83; see id. at 1132 (testimony of Russell Train,
Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality)
(criticizing "an across-the-board treatment requirement
unrelated to the benefits to be derived"). The
Administration produced a cost-benefit analysis that
claimed that the costs of the Senate version were
exorbitantly high compared to its benefits. Milazzo,
Unlikely Environmentalists, supra, at 227-28.
The House-passed bill sharply departed from the
Senate version on the role of cost-benefit analysis. For
determiining both BPT and BAT, the House bill
expressly instructed EPA to consider "the cost and the
economic, social, and environmental impacts of
achieving such effluent reduction." H.R. Rep. No. 92-
911, I Log. Hist. 794; see H.R. 11896, § 304(b)(1)(B) &
(b)(2)(B), 1 Leg. Hist. 980-81. The House bill also
declined to make the Phase II BAT requirement
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applicable absent subsequent congressional action. It
first required the National Academy of Sciences to
complete a cost-benefit analysis. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911,
1 Leg’. Hl~t. 789; see H.R. 11896, § 301(b)(2)(A), 1 Leg’.
Hi~t. 963-64. Finally, the House version provided that
technology-based provisions for new sources would not
apply to modified sources in the absence of a
"reasonable relationship" of costs to benefits. Id. at 798.
e. The Conference Committee met over six months
before reaching agreement.~ The two chambers split
~ The voluminous materials documenting the committee
negotiations on the precise wording of the bill’s language,
especially regarding technology-based standards and the proper
role of cost-benefit analysis, are all available in the National
Archives and located in a series of"Cartons" labeled "Accession No.
46-75-003, Senate Public Works Committee, Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution, Federal Water Pollution Legislation
Files." Within each box there are "Folders" with topic labels and
often smaller individual "Files" with topic labels. Only because the
more detailed history documented by the National Archives
provides a further layer of historical detail potentially of interest
to some members of the Court, this brief includes references to that
documentation. See notes 7-8, infra. The brief refers to six
documents located in four different committee files: (1) a file
labeled "316," containing drafts of Section 316, in a Folder labeled
"Conference Committee Language" contained in Carton No. 2; (2)
a file containing correspondence on "Phase I and Phase II," in a
Folder labeled "Conference Committee Memos" in Carton No. 2; (3)
files labeled "9/13" and "9/14," containing notes on the individual
sessions of the House and Senate conferees held on September 13th
and 14th, 1972, in a Folder labeled "House-Senate Conference
Committee 1972 Water Pollution Bill," in Carton No. 2; and (4) a
file labeled "General," containing internal committee memoranda
to Senator Muskie and to the Senate Conferees in a folder labeled
"House-Senate Conference Committee 1972 Water Pollution Bill"
in Carton No. 2. References to documents within this archival
material will hereinafter be referred to by the name of the
document, file name and the National Archives (e.g., "A Possible
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fundamentally on the central policy issue of whether the
degree of regulation should be defined, as the Senate
preferred, by technology-based standards that did not
turn on an assessment of water quality impacts and
cost-benefit analysis, or the House version, which did.7
In the fall of 1972, the conferees reached agreement
on a bill that each chamber passed by overwhelming
margins, and then Congress overrode a veto triggered
by the President’s view that the bill’s "unconscionable
$24 billion price tag" far outstripped its benefits. Veto
Basis for Agreement on Thermal Pollution, ’316 File’ Nat. Arch.").
For the Court’s convenience, we are filing a motion to lodge copies
of the National Archives materials cited.
7 The internal committee documents in the National Archives show
a persistent effort by some House conferees to allow EPA to
compare costs and benefits both in the establishment of technolog3T-
based standards and in allowing individual facilities to seek water
quality variances.    And, they also demonstrate an equally
persistent effort, mostly by Senate conferees, to resist both efforts
on the ground that such provisions would invariably invite back
into the regulatory equation the very consideration of water quality
impacts they believed would undermine the statute’s ability to
achieve :its goals. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leon G. Billings
[Staff Director] to Senate Conferees, Re: Options to the House
Proposal on Title III, 2 (June 15, 1972) ("Phase I and II File" Nat.
Arch.) ("The staff believes that the House proposal which would
require the application of new source performance standards to
existing sources by 1985 unless social and economic and
environmental cost outweighed social, economic and environmental
benefits "would be disastrous. * * * [T]here is no way to adequately
quantify the social and economic and environmental benefits of
pollution, control in relation to the cost associated with that
pollution control."); id. at 3 ("The House proposal is directly
contrary to the Senate concept in that it would require that * * * no
controls could be applied unless there were quantifiable benefits to
be achieved. This is nothing more or less than an extension of
water quality standards.").
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Message, I Leg. Hist. 137. The new law embraced the
technology-based approach favored by the Senate with
a two-phase approach for existing industrial point
sources of pollution and a separate standard for new
sources, but with a few discrete concessions to the
House.
The legislation enacted allowed for some "limited
cost-benefit analysis" in BPT’s determination for Phase
I, but not for BAT in Phase II. Statement of Sen.
Muskie, 1 Leg. Hist. 170. "In assessing the BPT the
Administrator is to consider ’the total cost of application
of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved from such application."’ EPA y.
National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. 64, 70 (1980). But "in
assessing BAT total cost is no longer to be considered in
comparison to effluent reduction benefits." Id. at 71; see
id. at 71 n.lO.
f. Congressional consideration of Section 316,
including Section 316(b)’s provision regarding a
technology-based standard applicable to cooling water
intake structures, reflects this same legislative debate
concerning the extent to which, if at all, Congress
should authorize EPA to compare costs and benefits in
regulating activities that adversely affect the aquatic
environment. The House and the Senate were, at the
outset, focusing largely on the impact of thermal
discharges, until the House introduced the related issue
of cooling water intake that had been discussed in the
prior legislative hearings.
On the discharge issue, the Senate bill favored
subjecting the discharge of heat to the generally
applicable technology-based standards for existing and
new sources. Statement of Sen. Muskie, 1 Leg. Hist.
175. The House bill, however, considered ’"neat"
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appropriate for regulation based on a cost-benefit
analysis. The House bill, accordingly, instructed EPA to
exempt a thermal discharge from regulation upon a
determination by EPA that "the economic and social
costs of implementing the regulations at a point source
bear no reasonable relationship to the economic and
social benefits (including water quality objectives) to be
attained." H.R. 11896, § 316(d), 1 Leg. Hist. 1043-44.
The House also called for consideration of "alternative
methods" for control, including "cooling devices," "once-
through cooling," and "evaporative cooling towers," and
instructed EPA to take into account "their relative social
and economic costs and benefits," and "their relative
impact on the environment, considering not only water
quality but also * * * conservation of natural resources."
!d. § 316(b).
The House and Senate conferees met over the
summer on Section 316 without reaching agreement,
but then reached a compromise agreement by drawing
a distinction between the regulation of thermal
discharges and cooling water intake,s Both would be
8 The stalemate continued over the summer (see Memorandum
from Leon Billings to Senator Muskie on "Status of the Water
Pollution Conference, 2-3 (July 11, 1972) ("General File" Nat.
Arch.)). On September 13th and 14th, the conferees broke the
logjam by representatives within each chamber suggesting a water-
quality approach for thermal discharge and a technology-based
approach, for cooling water intake. Under the House proposal,
regulation of thermal discharges would have been based on water
quality s~andards, and "cooling water intake facilities" would be
subject to a two-phase technology-based standard approach, with
a July 1, 1977, deadline for compliance with ’%est practicable
control technology" and a July 1, 1983 deadline for application of
’%est available demonstrated technology." See House Proposal on
Thermal.Discharges (offered 9/14), § 316(e)(1)&(2), ("316 File" Nat.
Arch.) Among the Senate conferees, Senator Jennings Randolph
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subject to technology-based standards, with "heat"
expressly defined as a "pollutant" and thereby
triggering the BPT and BAT technology-based
standards (see § 502(6), I Leg. Hist. 73), but a
biologically-based variance - expressed in terms of
protection of fish populations- would be made available
for thermal discharges under Section 316(a). See 86
Stat. 876, 1 Leg. Hist. 63. Section 316(b) set forth a
distinct statutory approach to cooling water intake. It
simply announced a technology-based standard ~br the
express purpose of "minimizing adverse environmental
impact" without any allowance for the kind of relaxing
of a technology-based standard contemplated by Section
316(a). 7d.
4.      EPA Initial Implementation
a. EPA first, promulgated Section 316(b)
regulations in 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 17387 (J.A. 38). The
Agency then refuted any claim of authority to compare
costs and benefits in determining the "best technology
available" ("BTA") required for cooling water intake
structures under Section 316(b). Rejecting an industry
recommendation, EPA explained not only that "[n]o
comparison of monetary costs with the social benefits of
minimizing adverse environmental impacts * * * is
proposed a similarly-bifurcated approach to thermal discharge and
cooling water intake, except that it provided that "[t]he design and
construction of cooling water intake structures would have to be in
accordance with the best available technology for minimizing
environmental effects." See A Possible Basis for Agreement on
Thermal Pollution ("316 File" Nat. Arch.); Notes on 9/13 and 9/14
Conference Meetings ("9/13 File" & "9/14 File" Nat. Arch.)
(describing Senator Randolph’s proposal at "9/13 File," p. 3). The
documents within the relevant files belie the Solicitor General’s
assumption (Br. 11, 23, 34) that Section 316(b) was a mere
"afterthought."
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required by the terms of the Act" (id. at 17388), but also
indicated that the Agency had no discretion to do so,
because "It] he statute directB the Agency to insure that
enumerated aspects of cooling water intake structures
reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental effects" and, consequently, "the
effort muBt be to select the most effective means of
minimizing (i.e., ’reducing to the smallest possible
amount or degree’) those adverse effects." Id. (emphases
supplied).
b. The Fourth Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, 566 F.2d 451 (1977) invalidated EPA’s Section
316(b) :regulations on procedural grounds. After more
than 15 years of inaction, EPA entered into a consent
decree to promulgate new regulations, which the
Agency ultimately accomplished in three specific
phases:9 (1) Phase I for cooling water intake structures
at new facilities that withdraw daily at least two million
gallons of water; (2) Phase II for intakes at larger
existing power plants; and (3) Phase III for structures
at new offshore and coastal oil and gas extraction
facilities, existing manufacturing facilities, and smaller
existing power plants. Pet. App. 6a. In the absence of
applicable Section 316(b) regulations in the interim
years, cooling water intake standards have been
relegated to adhoe determination by individual permit
writers - typically state agencies, exercising "best
professional judgment" pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(1)(B). See Natural Resourees Defense Council,
fne. v. ~PA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988).
e. In 2001, EPA promulgated its Phase I
9 These "phases" are entirely distinct from the two "phases"
Congress contemplated for technology-based standards under
Sections 301 and 304. See p. 12, supra.
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regulations, which were mostly upheld in Riverkeeper,
Inc. y. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 2004). See 66 Fed.
Reg. 65256 (2001). EPA promulgated its Phase II
regulations, challenged here, in 2004. See Pet. App.
122a-593a. The Agency promulgated its Phase III
regulations in 2006 (see 71 Fed. Reg. 35006), and a
challenge to that rulemaking is currently pending. See
ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, No. 06-60662 (5th Cir.).
B. A~lmlni~trative and Judicial Proceedings
Below
1. EPA Phase II Rulemaking
EPA’s Phase II Section 316(b) rulemaking applies
to cooling water intake structures with a design flow of
at least 50 million gallons of water per day at existing
power producing facilities subject to Section 301 of the
Clean Water Act. Pet. App. 9a-10a (40 C.F.R. § 125.91)).
EPA determined that closed-cycle cooling systems were
not required and that a covered point source could meet
the BTA standard by utilizing any of a "suite of
technologies" capable of meeting national technology-
based performance standards. Id. at 12a. These
performance standards required that impingement
mortality and entrainment be reduced for all life stages
of fish and shellfish within specified numeric ranges
(expressed as percentage reductions from a baseline),
with some facilities exempted from the entrainment
requirement. Id. at 12a-14a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)).
The Phase II regulations established several
compliance alternatives for achieving these standards.
Pet. App. 10a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)). The first included
a reduction in flow commensurate with a closed-cycle
recirculating system, which would be deemed sufficient
to meet both impingement mortality and entrainment
performance standards. Id. at 12a (§ 125.94(a)(1)(i)).
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Another option was "a site-specific compliance
alternative" that required a permitting authority to
make a site-specific determination of BTA that is "as
close as practicable" to national performance standards
if a facility demonstrated that its compliance costs
would be "significantly greater than the benefits of
complying" with the performance standards. See ~’d. at
14a (§ ]L25.94(a)(5)(i)).
2. Lower Court Decision
Bo~h industry petitioners and environmental and
state respondents petitioned for review of the EPA
Phase II rulemaking, which was heard on direct review
by the Second Circuit. The appellate court denied
almost all industry challenges1° and granted relief in
response to all respondents’ claims.11 Pet. App. la-94a.
First, the court held that EPA had failed to explain
adequately the basis of its rulemaking. The "record
evidence alone * * * is oblique, complicated, and
insufficient to permit us to determine what the EPA
relied upon in reaching its conclusion." Pet. App. 35a;
10 The court rejected industry challenges to EPA’s application of
Section 316(b) to existing sources, definition of "adverse
environmental impact," assumption of zero entrainment survival,
lack of definition of "Great Lakes," and failure to account for the
supposedly disproportionate impact on the nuclear industry. None
of those rulings is affected by this Court’s disposition of this case.
11 Because the question presented by this case is distinct from most
of these rulings in favor of respondents below, a remand to EPA is
necessary regardless of the outcome in this case. Lower court
rulings include that facilities cannot meet national performance
standards based on use of restoration measures, that the ranges
within EPA’s national performance standards impermissibly
allowed facilities capable of meeting higher standards to meet
lower standards instead, and that there was inadequate notice of
various other aspects of the rule.
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see also 2"d. at 33a ( "difficult to discern from the record
how EPA determined that the cost of closed-cycle cooling
could not be reasonably borne by the industry").
Second, the court held that "the language of 316(b)
itself plainly indicates that facilities must adopt the best
technology available and that cost-benefit analysis
cannot be justified in light of Congress’s directive." Pet.
App. 23a-24a (emphasis omitted). The court stressed,
however, that EPA could take costs into account. The
terms ’%est available" meant EPA should consider
whether the costs of a particular technology colald be
"reasonably borne" by the industry. Id. at 24a. The
court also made clear that if more than one technology
achieves "essentially the same results," EPA can
"appropriately choose the cheaper technology" on cost-
effectiveness grounds. Id. at 27a.
On this same ground, the court faulted both EPA’s
rejection of the closed-cycle cooling option for national
performance standards and its allowance of a site-
specific cost-benefit compliance variance option. With
regard to the former, the court ruled that it could not
discern whether EPA had improperly relied on a cost-
benefit comparison because, as previously described, the
Agency had failed to articulate the basis of its decision.
The court, accordingly, remanded to EPA for an
adequate explanation of its decision..l-d, at 32a, 36a-37a.
The court, however, squarely concluded that the
cost-benefit variance option was invalid: "The Agency
is * * * precluded from undertaking such cost benefit
analysis because the BTA standard represents
Congress’s conclusion that the costs imposed on
industry in adopting the best cooling water intake
structure available * * * are worth the benefits in
reducing adverse environmental impacts." Pet. App.
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57a-58a. The court further noted how the site-specific
cost-benefit compliance option directly contravened
Congress’s policy choice in the Act not to relax
technology-based standards on the basis of local water
quality., Id. at 58a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The short answer to the question posed by this
Court in granting certiorari is that Congress did not
authorize EPA in Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act
to compare costs and benefits in determining the "best
technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact" of cooling water intake
structures. Congress instead exercised its prerogative
to answer that essential policy question itself by
prescribing the extent to which both costs should be
incurred and benefits should be achieved. And,
Congress’s deliberate decision to adopt a technology-
based performance standard approach that precludes
EPA from striking a different cost-benefit balance is
entirely in keeping with the legislature’s highly
successful decision in 1972 to free the safeguarding of
the nation’s waters from the scientific and economic
uncertainties inherent in the application of water
quality standards.
A. To find the answer to the question posed by this
Court, one need look no further than the plain meaning
of Section 316(b)’s language. The statute provides that
EPA faust develop standards governing the design,
location, construction, and capacity of cooling water
intake structures that reflect the "best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact." Congress, accordingly, made clear the two
defining touchstones for EPA’s determination of this
particular "best technology" standard. The technology
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must be "available" and it must be the best of those
available technologies for "minimizing adverse
environmental impact." The former governs the extent
to which costs can and must be tolerated, and the latter
establishes the extent to which environmental benefits
can and must be achieved consistent with those costs.
What is not left for EPA is any authority to
reconsider how those costs and benefits should be
weighed in comparison to each other. EPA can no more
determine that the costs of available technology do not
warrant the benefits of minimizing the adverse
environmental impact than it can conclude that the
benefits warrant a cost higher than that supported by
available technology. Congress took both those
inquiries off the table.
B. The Clean Water Act’s overall structure
confirms Section 316(b)’s plain meaning. Throughout
the Act, Congress used precise and particular language
to make clear to what extent costs and benefits could be
considered by EPA in the establishment of various
technology-based performance standards and when, in
carefully limited contexts, any independent comparison
by EPA of the relation of those costs to pollution control
benefits would be permissible. Within that broader
statutory context, Congress’s contrasting failure to
provide EPA with any such cost-benefit comparison
authority in Section 316(b) is dispositive of the question
presented in this case.
C. In the face of such clear statutory meaning, the
legislative history need not be consulted. But, not
surprisingly, that history fully corroborates the
statutory text’s plain meaning. What that history
reveals is that the single most important policy issue
facing Congress and the White House in 1972 was the
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extent to which Congress should strike the cost-benefit
balance itself or instead delegate such authority to EPA
in the establishment of water pollution controls capable
of meeting the nation’s ambitious goals for protecting
water quality. The Senate and House embraced sharply
contrasting approaches and reached a compromise bill
only after more than six months of conference
committee deliberations on the precise statutory
wording on the role of costs, benefits, and their
compari~son. The final bill repeatedly eliminated
language in different sections that would have
authorized EPA to engage in the kinds of cost-benefit
comparisons petitioners here advocate.
Indeed, Section 316 itself expresses a clear
congressional compromise directly relevant to the
resolution of this case, based on the different policy
approaches that Congress embraced in addressing the
regulation of thermal discharges in Section 316(a) and
cooling water intake in Section 316(b). For the former,
Congress rejected a House proposal to authorize EPA to
engage in cost-benefit analysis, but Congress did allow
EPA to excuse compliance with a technology-based
standard upon demonstration of achievement of a
prescribed biologically-based standard. But for the
latter, Congress required a strict technology-based
approach under which Congress itself answered the
question of how costs and benefits should be compared:
the adverse environmental impact must be "minimized"
by use of the "best technology available."
D. What EPA plainly cannot now do is write back
into the statute the very wide-ranging authority to
compare costs and benefits that Congress purposely
denied EPA. Nor can this Court second’guess that
legislative policy determination. The judgment of the
court of appeals should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
SECTION 316(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT DOES
NOT AUTHORIZE EPA TO DETERMINE THE "BEST
TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE FOR MINIMIZING
ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT" BASED ON
THE AGENCY’S OWN COMPARISON OF THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES
We note at the outset that industry petitioners and
the Solicitor General fundamentally disagree on the
proper analytic framework for resolving the question
presented.12 Industry petitioners believe that Section
316(b)’s meaning is plain and unambiguously authorizes
EPA to compare costs and benefits in establishing BTA.
See Entergy Br. 31-32; UWAC- Br. 31. The Solicitor
General, however, contends that the statutory language
"does not speak to the question presented" but is instead
ambiguous. U.S. Brief 15. The Solicitor General
nonetheless argues that EPA’s view of Section 316(b)
should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language. Id. at 15-23.
The Solicitor General is correct that the statute’s
plain meaning does not support industry petitioners’
reading of Section 316(b). But the Solicitor General is
wrong in contending that the language is ambiguous
and can be reasonably construed to allow EPA authority
to compare costs and benefits. The plain meaning, as
12 Because the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent EPA is
aligned with industry petitioners on the question before this Court,
general ~eferences in this brief to the "petitioners" will refer both
to the Solicitor General and industry petitioners. Otherwise:, these
parties will be referred to separately as the "Solicitor General" and
"industry petitioners."
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evidenced by the language Congress used in Section
316(b), the statutory structure and purpose, and the
legislati~e history, denies EPA any such authority, and
the relevant statutory language cannot be reasonably
construed to support the Solicitor General’s position.
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 316(b) Makes
Clear that Comparing Costs and Benefits Is
Outside the Scope of EPA’s Authority in
Determining the "Best Technology Available
for Minimizing Adverse Environmental
Impact" of Cooling Water Intake Structures
1. Petitioners strive mightily to avoid the plain
meaning of the words Congress actually wrote in
Section 316(b) by seizing on a series of "sometimes"
(U.S. Br. 16) meanings of the statutory language
derived not from the primary, secondary, or even
tertiary definitions of the relevant terms but from the
octonary ones.    They accordingly concoct an
extraordinary reading of Section 316(b) that is
boundless in its delegation of lawmaking authority to
EPA:
[T]he ’/)e~t technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact’ may be the most
suitable or desirable technology available for
reducing such impact, to whatever extent the
decisionmaker believes appropriate in light of
competing values.
Entergy Br. 36.
"Best" is therefore stripped out of its statutory
context to allow EPA to select the technology it prefers
based on whatever factors it deems appropriate. See
Entergy Br. 33; U.S. Br. 15-16. The statutory
requirement that the technology be best "for minimizing
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adverse environmental impact" is completely undone by
the claim that the word "for" allows EPA to decide
whether a particular technology is "suitable" or
"appropriate" based on whichever factors it deems
proper, wholly apart from the statutory requirement
that adverse environmental impacts be "minimiz[ed]" by
available technology. See U.S. Br. 16. And, finally, the
"minimizing" standard itself is transformed into no
more than a "reduction" aspiration that EPA is
permitted to pursue while simultaneously pursuing
other competing values of its choice. See U.S. Br. 17-18;
Entergy Br. 34-35.
Contrary to petitioners’ proffer, however, the role
of a court in construing statutory language is not to
determine its strained meaning, but its plain meaning.
While discernment of the former might call for a journey
into rarefied and unlikely uses of language, the latter is
much simpler and therefore more judicial. It looks to
the primary and ordinary meaning of the language
Congress used in its context. Here, moreover, the
ordinary meaning of the language at issue is wholly
consistent with the primary definitions of all the
relevant terms. Section 316(b) means exactly what it
says.
a. First, the word "best" in no manner authorizes
EPA to engage in wide-ranging cost-benefit analysis.
The primary, ordinary meaning of "best" when used, as
in Section 316(b), as an adjective is "surpassing all
others in excellence."    The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 173 (4th ed. 2000);
see Web~ter’~ Third New International Dictionary 208
(1971) ("excelling or surpassing all others of its kind");
2 The Oxford English Dictionary 139 (2d ed. 1989).
If, of course, Section 316(b) provided only that EPA
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should determine the ’%est technology," without more,
then peti~tioners might reasonably argue that Congress
had delegated to EPA authority to determine what the
technology should be ’%est" at accomplishing. But
Section 316(b) does no such thing. The statute
expressl:~ dictates precisely what the technology must be
best "for": "minimizing adverse environmental impact."
b. Here too, the meaning of "for" is clear and we
need look no further than its primary meaning: "used to
indicate the object, aim, or purpose of an action or
activity." The American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at
686. The Solicitor General’s desperate seizure of an
eighth meaning in support of its claim that the word
"for" instead confers on EPA broad discretion to decide
whether technology is "suitable" or "appropriate" is self-
refuting. See The Ameriean Heritage Dietionary, supra,
at 686 (8th definition); 6 The Oxford English Dictionary,
supra, at 24 (13th definition); Edwin B. Williams et al.
eds., Zhe Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary 356
(1977) (’appropriate" listed as the 18th definition). And,
in all events, the statutory language prescribes precisely
what the technology must be suitable for: minimizing
adverse environmental impact.
e. Nor is there any more merit in petitioners’
contention that the word "minimizing" merely calls for
EPA "to reduce" based on the Agency’s own balancing of
the value of such reduction compared to other competing
values. As EPA originally recognized in 1976 (see 41
Fed. Reg. 17388 (J.A. 41)), the ordinary definition of
"minimize" in its statutory context is "to reduce to the
smallest possible amount, extent, size, or degree" and
not simply "to reduce." The American Heritage
Dictionary, supra, at 1119; 9 The Oxford English
Dictionary, supra, at 815; Webstor’~ Third New
International Dictionary, supra, at 1438.
Even more fundamentally, the plain meaning of
"minimizing" does not contemplate a balance at all, let
alone a cost-benefit comparison. The purpose of a cost-
benefit balance is not to minimize adverse
environmental impact, but to determine the permissible
environmental impact based on the wholly different
policy premise that the cost of reduction should, not be
greater than the corresponding benefits. A
"minimizing" standard permits no such comparison.
Nor, of course, does the "minimizing" requirement
mandate that one must reduce at all costs. Where, as
with Section 316(b), the statute further provides that
the technology must be "available," that separate
requirement ensures that costs are considered in
determining whether the technology is available. But,
consideration of costs is a far cry from a cost-benefit
comparison.13
d. There is, to be sure, some potential ambiguity
in terms of what the word "available" means - in
particular, whether it extends beyond physically
available to include economically available. See The
American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 123 ("present
and ready for use; at hand; accessible"); Web~terg" Third
New International Dictionary, supra, at 150 ("accessible
or may be obtained"). The Second Circuit held that the
term "available" allows EPA to consider costs in
determining whether a particular technology is feasible
for a particular category of facilities. This has long been
13 Petitioners repeatedly conflate the two, suggesting that the issue
here is whether EPA can consider costs under Section 316(b) and
further suggesting environmental respondents contend EPA cannot
do so. We make no such claim, and that is not the issue before the
Court, which is limited to EPA’s authority to undertake cost-
benefit comparisons.
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EPA’s view, and we do not dispute that threshold
proposition. But permitting EPA to consider economic
feasibility in determining whether a given technology is
"available" on a categorical basis is wholly different
from permitting the Agency, contrary to the statute’s
plain terms, to decide that the costs of such technology,
while economically feasible for an industry, do not
warrant "minimizing adverse environmental impact."
2. The only limitation on the extent of benefits
to be achieved, therefore, is the cost of available
technology. The statute leaves no room for EPA to
conclude that those benefits are not worth the costs of
available technology. Nor does the statutory language,
conversely, authorize EPA to conclude that the benefits
to be ob ~ained warrant expenditures even higher than
those called for by available technology. Both those
policy inquiries are outside the bounds of
congressionally delegated lawmaking authority under
Section 316(b).
The Solicitor General’s contrary argument rests on
a false syllogism. He argues that because Congress
authorized EPA to consider costs and to consider
benefits, the legislature must be deemed to have
authorized the Agency to compare the two. See U.S. Br.
30. But that is precisely what Congress did not do.
And, deliberately so.
Congress instructed EPA to consider the costs in
order to ensure "availability." And the legislature
likewise instructed the Agency to consider the benefits
in order to ensure that environmental impact was
minimized. But Congress did not permit EPA to second-
guess the legislative iudgment that environmental
impact must be minimized with available technology by
authorizing the Agency to weigh the benefits of the
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former against the costs of the latter. "Congress itself
defined the basic relationship between costs and
benefits * * *" (American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981)) and
did not leave it to EPA to decide what value to assign to
these competing interests. Cf. Dept. of Revenue,
Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part) ("Of course you cannot decide
which interest ’outweighs’ the other without deciding
which interest is more important to you.").
3. Petitioners dangle the usual parade of absurd
results they claim will result from reading Section
316(b) based on its plain meaning. None has credence.
Although Section 316(b)’s plain meaning defeats
petitioners’ claim that EPA can compare costs and
benefits in determining BTA, EPA retains discretion to
administer Section 316(b) in a manner that is both
consistent with congressional intent and capable of
avoiding petitioners’ proffered horribles.
a. For example, Section 316(b)’s denial of any
authority to EPA to compare costs and benefits in
determining BTA does not mean that EPA lacks any
discretion in determining which "adverse environmental
impact" must be minimized. Many of petitioners’
proposed absurdities are rooted in the notion that EPA
is authorized to minimize only entrainment and
impingement (which EPA found to be the "primary,
harmful environmental effects" that specific
technologies can reduce (Pet. App. 234a)), and EPA can
give no regard to other kinds of possible adverse
environmental impacts related to the location, design,
construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures. Nothing in the plain meaning of Section
316(b), however, compels such an illogical result.
Indeed, the Second Circuit acknowledged EPA’s
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authority to consider also energy efficiency and other
environmental impacts. See Id. at 26a-27a n.12.I~
b. Nor is there any merit to the absurd result most
often repeated by petitioners and their amici: the
specter of industry paying billions of dollars to save one
fish (or trillions to save one hapless individual
plankton). Although the meaning of "minimizing" is
plainly ~Lot merely to reduce, it is also just as plainly not
so constricted as to require EPA to require industry
petitioners to spend billions to save one more fish or
plankton. Certainly nothing in the plain meaning of the
terms "minimizing adverse environmental impact"
compels EPA to establish its BTA standards as precise
single-number limitations without any flexibility or
margin of error. Just as in other legal contexts, there
can be de mi~in~Js differences. And, the Agency has
some discretion (albeit not boundless) to determine that
further differences in reduction would be so minor as to
be unnecessary for compliance with the minimizing
requirement. Petitioner UWAG acknowledges this
critical point: "Minimizing adverse environmental
impact" is "indisputably broad enough to authorize EPA
* * * to decide at what point [impacts] have been
’minim~zed."’ UWAG Br. 45. We agree.
Hence, if the reduction in adverse environmental
impact to be gained from an "enormously expensive"
technology would be without "any meaningful
environmental consequence" (Entergy Br. 50), with "no
~4 The full range of "adverse environmental impacts" EPA can
consider and the weight each is assigned are not before the Court
because they present questions distinct from EPA’s authority to
compare costs and benefits. Prudence supports deferral of their
resolution to a case where, unlike here, they are squarely and
necessarily presented.
3O
corresponding environmental benefit" (API Amicus Br.
4), or "identical" to much less expensive measures
(American Chemistry Council Amicus Br. 8), Section
316(b) would not compel adoption of the more expensive
technology because impacts will have already been
minimized by the less expensive technology.
It would not, for this same reason, require a facility
that withdraws cooling water from a water body ’with no
aquatic organisms at all - a completely implausible
scenario - to implement expensive controls to meet
BTA. See Entergy Br. 50. Section 316(b) does no,t, after
all, require EPA to order that a certain technology be
used, but permits the Agency instead to establish
performance standards that reflect the use of available
technology. In the Phase II rule, EPA did just that,
expressing the performance standards as percentage
ranges for the reduction of impingement mortality and
entrainment. If a water body has no aquatic life and
therefore a facility has no adverse environmental
impact, then it should be able to meet such a
performance-based standard without the need for the
expensive controls that would be necessary for facilities
in other areas. In that (unlikely) scenario, run-of-the-
mill technology would protect exactly the same number
of fish (and therefore have the same environmental
impact) as state-of-the-art technology, and satisfy the
environmental performance standard. ~5
In other ways, EPA possesses discretion to
announce a standard that satisfies the minimization of
15 But, of course, if the intake structure’s past operations are the
reason for the current lack of aquatic organisms, which would
return in significant amounts upon intake reduction, then one
could not posit that the continued withdrawal of large volumes of
water is having no "adverse environmental impact."
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adverse environmental impact requirement without
adopting a one-size-fits-all rule. As the court below
explained, in doing so EPA retains discretion to decide
that the minimization requirement does not mandate
some precise numerical reduction ("identically
effective") but can be satisfied by a reduction within a
prescribed range or, presumably, by not harming more
than a prescribed amount. Pet. App. 28a. Cost-benefit
comparison authority is not necessary to achieve this
sensible end.1~
c. Finally, equally unavailing are the absurd
hypotheticals that petitioners advance based on the
supposition that EPA is always required to make BTA
determinations on the broadest categorical basis
conceivable. Thus, petitioners claim that our suggested
reading of Section 316(b)’s terms means that EPA will
be forced to ignore any and all differences among
facilities and their locations. See UWAG Br. 43-50;
16 That is why the court did not rule below (Pet. App. 38a-44a), nor
did we argue, that EPA was precluded from using any ranges in its
BTA national performance standards describing the reduction of
adverse environmental impact to be achieved. The problem with
EPA’s ranges in its Phase II rulemaking was not the mere fact that
they were ranges, but that the rule allowed facilities fully capable
of achieving performance near the upper end of the range to choose
technology to meet only the lower end. Id. at 43a. For this same
reason, moreover, regardless of the Court’s disposition of the
question presented in this case, the Court should reject the claim
of the Solicitor General (Br. 39 n.3) and Entergy (Br. 58-59) that
this Court should also reverse the lower court’s ruling on the
validity of EPA’s ranges. The Second Circuit’s invalidation of those
ranges rested on a legal ground distinct from the cost-benefit
question now before the Court, petitioners chose not to petition on
that dis~inct issue, and they should not be allowed now to "smuggle
additional questions into a case before [the Court] after the grant
of certiorari." Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct.
799, 805 (2007).
Nuclear Energy Institute Amicus Br. 22-25; Nebraska,
et al. Amicus Br 8-10.
Petitioners and their amici are confusing distinct
issues and trying to inject a legal issue into the case not
in fact presented. Whether EPA can compare costs and
benefits in determining BTA and whether EPA can
determine BTA based on site-specific, narrow, or broad
categorical bases present different legal issues.17 We do
not deny, moreover, that the language of Section 316(b),
focusing on features such as "location, design,
construction, and capacity," naturally lends itself to
tailored agency regulation based on less broad
categories. And, we did not challenge in this case
several aspects of the Phase II rule that drew
distinctions based on considerations such as location.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(2)(ii)(A) (2007) (’~our
facility uses cooling water withdrawn from a tidal river,
~7 Industry petitioners and their amici insist that the only sensible
approach is site-specific, not categorical, determinations of BTA
performance standards. Entergy Br. 46-48; UWAG Br. 7-10,45-57;
Nuclear Energy Institute Amicus Br. 4, 22-25; Nebraska, et al.
Amicus Br. 8-10. The sole question presented in this case,
however, is whether EPA can compare costs and benefits in setting
BTA standards under Section 316(b), and the answer to that
question does not depend on whether EPA is making its BTA
determination on a categorical (whether broadly or narrowly
drawn) or site-specific basis. The extent of EPA’s discretionary
authority to make determinations on site-specific grounds or on a
narrow rather than broad categorical basis is an entirely distinct
issue (see Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116,
131 (1985); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
126-129 (1977)) and, in the context of Section 316(b), is at issue
now in the Fifth Circuit’s review of EPA’s Phase III regulations.
See ConocoPhillips Co., et al. v. EPA, No. 06-60662 (5th Cir.). Here
again, industry petitioners should not be allowed to inject new
questions not fairly presented by the Court’s grant of review. See
note 16, supra.
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estuary, ocean, or one of the Great Lakes * * *") (Pet.
App. 560a); Id. § 125.94(b)(2)(ii)(B) (’~/our facility uses
cooling water withdrawn from a freshwater river or
stream * * *’) (Pet. App. 560a).
Of course, as always, EPA’s discretion here is not
boundless, because otherwise EPA could too easily
subvert the technology-forcing aspect of the BTA
standard. But that limit’s outer bounds are not
implicated by this case. For the purposes of this case, it
should be sufficient to note that none of the arguments
we present as to Section 316(b)’s plain meaning on the
question in fact presented in this case compels the
crabbed reading of EPA’s authority upon which
petitioners’ projected absurdities depend.
In sum, there is nothing absurd about applying
Section 316(b) according to its plain terms. Section
316(b) may well be Herculean in its ambition, but there
is nothing "Sisyphean" in the tasks it assigns. Entergy
Br. 52.
B. The Statutory Structure and Context
Confirm Section 316(b)’s Plain Meaning
The Clean Water Act’s statutory structure and
context confirm Section 316(b)’s plain meaning by
underscoring the deliberate and limited way Congress
chose to authorize EPA to relate costs to benefits in the
establishing of environmental protection standards
under the Act. "Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in
anothe:r * * *, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion." Keene Corp. v. U.~., 508 U.S.
200, 208 (1993), q~otY~FR~e]]o v. U.~., 464 U.S. 15,
23 (1983); see Allison Engine v. U.~. ex re]. ~under~,
128 S. Ct. 2123, 2129 (2008).
When Congress passed the Clean Water Act in
1972, it displayed a striking reluctance to authorize
EPA to base its determination of environmental
performance standards on a comparison of costs and
benefits. As previously described (see pp. 6-8,
Congress deliberately severed the determination of
those performance standards from a showing of water
quality impacts because of the tremendous scientific and
economic uncertainties associated with measuring and
assessing those impacts. The Act mandated that EPA
promulgate a series of demanding requirements, yet
expressly authorized EPA to compare costs and benefits
in determining the degree of controls to be imposed in
only two extremely limited circumstances.
1. First, Congress authorized EPA to compare
costs and benefits in the promulgation of one
technology-based effluent limitation.    Section
304(b)(1)(B) provided that among the factors that EPA
shall consider in determining BPT is the "total cost of
application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved * * * " 33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(1)(B). The only other instance in 1972 when
Congress expressly called for a direct cost-benefit
comparison was in providing for an exemption from the
application of water quality based effluent limitations
that are more stringent than technology-based effluent
limitations under Section 302. See Pub. L. 92-500, §
302, 86 Stat. 846 (1972) (subsequently amended).
Under that provision, EPA cannot apply any such more
stringent standard to a person who demonstrates that
"there is no reasonable relationship between the
economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained
¯ * * " Id. § 302(b)(2). Neither of these examples
advances petitioners’ cause.
a. In 1972, when Congress created the BPT
standard, Congress made clear its intent to phase BPT
out and replace it no later than 1983 with a different
technology-based standard, BAT, that was designed to
be more stringent than BPT and lacked any comparable
allowance for EPA to relate costs and benefits in its
determination. Indeed, this Court has noted the
contrast between the statutory language used for BPT
and BAT, the absence of any cost-benefit language for
BAT, and Congress’s obvious desire not to authorize
EPA to engage in such a comparison in determining
BAT. See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 71 ( "in assessing
BAT total cost is no longer to be considered in
comparison to effluent reduction benefits").
Petitioners and their amici ignore the clear import
of the congressional decision to provide for limited cost-
benefit analysis in determining BPT for a few years and
to eliminate any such analysis in BAT’s determination
by asserting that the only difference between BPT and
BAT is that the Agency is requiredto engage in limited
cost-benefit analysis for the former and permitted to do
so for the latter. See U.S. Br. 21, 24; Entergy Br. 39-40;
UWAG Br. 35-36; ACC Amicus Br. 22-23. Their
primary textual support for this extraordinary claim is
the inclusion in Section 304(b)(2)(B), which lists the
factors EPA is to consider in determining BAT, of a final
clause referring to "such other factors as the
Admin:istrator deems appropriate." 33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(2)(B).
That clause cannot, however,be reasonably
construed to completely upend theselective and
deliberate manner in which Congress had otherwise
carefully prescribed the precise extent to which costs
and benefits could be considered, and when, if ever, the
Agency was empowered to compare one to the other.
There is not even a hint of support in the text or
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legislative history of the clause for petitioners’ radical
notion that the only policy dispute separating the House
and Senate was whether EPA would be required to
engage in cost-benefit analysis, including assessment of
water quality impacts, rather than a uthorizedto do so.iS
Just the opposite is true. As this Court has
previously noted, the legislative history leaves no
question that Congress intended for BAT to be more
stringent than BPT, and the absence of authority to
engage in cost-benefit analysis consideration in
determining BAT was a major basis for that intended
difference. The Court described in Crushed Stone how
the statute sets forth "[s]imilar directions" for the
determination of BPT and BAT in Sections 304(b)(1)(B)
and 304(b)(2)(B) with the single exception that "in
assessing BAT total cost is no longer to be considered in
comparison to effluent reduction benefits." 449 U.S. at
71; see 1 Leg. Hist. 170 (statement of Senator Muskie)
("In making the determination of ’best available’ for a
category or class, the Administrator is expected to apply
the same principles involved in making the
determination of ’best practicable’ (outlined above)
except as to cost-benefit analysis.") (emphasis supplied).
In light of the contrasting language and the clear
congressional purpose to ensure that BAT was "more
stringent" than the "more modest" BPT (Chemical
Manu£aeturers Ass’~, 470 U.S. at 118; Crushed Stone,
449 U.S. at 75 n.14), it is beyond any notion of
plausibility to construe the final clause in Section
is The difference between petitioners’ notion of mandate versus
permission is also likely illusory. If, as petitioners contend
(Entergy Br. 31), EPA is permitted to compare costs and benefits,
no doubt industry petitioners would also argue that EPA would be
acting arbitrarily and capriciously by not doing so.
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304(b)(2)(B) as, in effect, permitting EPA to inject back
into the BAT determination any factor of its choosing,
including presumably cost-benefit analysis even more
forgiving than that provided for in Section 304(b)(1)(B)
for BPT.19 "Congress * * * does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms c,r ancillary provisions - it does not, one might
say, hide elephants in mouseholes." Whitman v.
American TruckingA~s’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001);
Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006). It is
significant in this regard that the language of this final
clause was not added during the lengthy Senate and
House conference discussions, but was included in the
original Senate bill, which eschewed providing EPA
with the kind of open-ended authority petitioners
nonetheless claim here. See S. 2770 §§ 304(b)(1)(B) &
304(b)(2)(B), 2 Leg. HJ~t. 1615 ("and such other factors
as the Administrator deems appropriate").2°
b. Section 302 is likewise unavailing to petitioners.
It requi[res EPA to undertake a cost-benefit comparison,
but not for the purpose of relaxing compliance with a
technology-based standard, let alone for determining
such a standard. See Pub. L. 92-500, § 302, 86 Stat.
846. Instead, costs and benefits are compared under
Section 302 only for the very different purpose of
relaxin.g application of a water quality st~ndard that is
19 Of course, whatever its meaning, in no event is the language of
Section 304(b)(2)(B) part of Section 316(b). The Solicitor General
is correct that "[t]he only direct consequence of the cross-reference
[in Section 316(b) to Sections 301 and 306] is a procedural one,"
indicating which standards must require BTA for cooling water
intake structures. U.S. Br. 18-19.
s0 For a further refutation of petitioners’ claim on this issue, see
Environmental Law Professors Amicus Br. II.B; Environment
America Amicus Br.
more stringent than a technology-based standard if
there is "no reasonable relationship" of costs to benefits.
§ 302(b)((2). Such a differently-directed provision
provides no support for petitioners’ suggestioJ.~ that
Congress intended to confer authority on EPA in Section
316(b) to compare costs and benefits in determining
BTA.2~
c. Nor are petitioners supported by the two
instances in which Congress in 1972 authorized EPA to
take water quality impact into account as a possible
basis for relaxing a technology-based standard. The
first allows for a modification of BAT for individual
sources for which compliance cost is particularly
onerous so long as the source demonstrates fi~rther
reasonable progress toward discharge elimination. See
33 U.S.C. § 1311(c). The second, Section 316(a), applies
to thermal discharges and allows for an exemption from
a technology-based effluent limitation upon a showing
that its application is not necessary to meet statutorily-
described fish population objectives. Neither of these
narrowly-drawn provisions, however, contemplates
EPA’s undertaking a cost-benefit comparison or
otherwise authorizes EPA to determine how the cost-
benefit balance should be struck. In each, Congress
declared how the balance should be struck. Both
accordingly provide further reason for believing that
21 Indeed, a parenthetical within Section 302 made clear that
Congress assumed that technology-based standards were not based
on cost-benefit comparisons. The parenthetical provides that the
lack of a reasonable cost-benefit relationship is grounds for
relaxing the water-quality-based effluent limitation "whether or
not such technology * * * [is] available," further underscoring
Congress’s belief that a technology could be "available" even absent
a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits. Pub. L. 92-
500, § 302(b)(2).
Congress did not intend to provide EPA with sweeping
authorilLy to engage in cost-benefit comparisons in the
absence of express legislative authorization. Perhaps
that is why the Solicitor General fails even to
acknowledge Section 316(a)’s existence in his brief.
2. Petitioners and their amici also mistakenly rely
on a host of other Clean Water Act provisions in an
effort to buttress their argument that Congress
intended, with statutory silence, to authorize EPA to
compare costs and benefits in determining BTA. Hence,
they point out the Act also provides for :
¯ A technology-based standard for
conventional pollutants that, like BPT,
allows for some consideration of the
relationship of costs and benefits (33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(4)(B)); see U.S. Br. 20; Entergy Br.
39; ACC Amicus Br. 19); and
¯ A series of variances for:
¯ Some pollutants to allow their
control to be reduced from BAT to
BPT (33 U.S.C. § 1311(g); see U.S.
Br. 21; UWAG Br. 47; Entergy Br.
43-44);
¯ Some kinds of discharges into deep
waters or marine waters (33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(h)&(m); see Entergy Br. 36);
and
¯ Some discharges of toxic pollutants
subject to BAT standards (33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(n); see Entergy Br. 44-45).
None of these provisions, however, aids petitioners’
claim on the issue presented. First, Congress added
each of these provisions long after 1972 and the
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question in this case is what Congress intended in 1972,
when it enacted Section 316(b), and not in later years
when it changed other provisions of the Clean Water Act
unrelated to Section 316(b). No less important, each of
these provisions demonstrates that Congress continued
after 1972 to take extreme care and to act with great
precision in deciding when to authorize EPA to compare
costs and benefits either in establishing environmental
performance standards or excusing facilities from
compliance with such standards.
For instance, the reason Congress decided to create
the BCT standard was that, contrary to petitioners’
submission here, Congress understood that the BAT
standard is "not subject to any test of cost in relation to
effluent reduction benefits or any form of cost/benefit
analysis" and that "in establishing limitations for
conventional pollutants * * * the best available
technology may not be the most appropriate technology
in terms of the relationship of the cost of achieving a
particular level of reduction and the amount of
reduction actually achieved." 3 Legislative History of
the Clean Water Act of 1977- A Continuation of the
Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution
ControlAetAmendments o£1972, 427 (Committee Print
compiled for the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 95-14
(1975) (hereinafter" 3 Leg. Hist.") (statement of Senate
Manager Senator Muskie). For this reason, and for
conventional pollutants only, Congress amended the Act
to include the same kind of limited cost-benefit analysis
already available in BPT as part of the basis for
determining BCT: to ensure that costs for one narrow
class of pollutants did not increase "beyond the ’knee of
the curve,’ the take-off point where incremental costs
begin to exceed incremental benefits." Id. at 330
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(statement of House Manager Rep. Roberts).
So, too, some of the justifications that Congress
gave for making subsequent changes in the law to
provide for additional variances in narrowly-defined
circumstances mirror some of the arguments petitioners
advance now before this Court. See, e.g., 3 Leg. Hist.
258 (Conference Report) (new variance in "recognition
that there are some coastal areas of the United States
* * * where natural factors provide *** sufficient
elimination of traditional forms of pollution"). But, of
course, that is precisely why the subsequent
amend:ments upon which petitioners rely cut against
petitioners’ position. They demonstrate the correct way
to change the law if one believes, as petitioners plainly
do, that statutory provisions enacted in 1972 may be
unduly harsh in some possible application. No doubt
petitioners are disappointed that their efforts to date to
persuade Congress have been unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
H.R. Rep. No. 112 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 27-28
(1995) (H.R. 961, § 318, proposing to amend Section
316(b) to allow for consideration of "[t]he relative
environmental, social, and economic costs and
benefits"). But such failure before Congress provides no
basis for crossing the street and seeking relief from this
Court.
3. Finally, there is no merit to petitioners’
contentions that the ruling below relied on a "plain
statement rule" disfavoring cost-benefit analysis or
somehow contravened this Court’s decision in C_beyron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), by failing to treat statutory silence as
establishing ambiguity. See U.S. Br. 30-32; Entergy Br.
24, 26 n.8.
a. First, neither environmental respondents nor
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the Second Circuit relied on any "plain statement rule"
that disfavors in all contexts a conclusion that Congress
has authorized an agency to engage in cost-benefit
comparison. Like the court below, we contend only that
the meaning of the words Congress has chosen depends
on their statutory context and whether that context
makes it more or less likely that Congress intended a
particular result in the absence of an express statement
one way or the other. See, e.g., Dolan v. Postal Service,
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Davis v. Michigan Dep~. of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). That is why ’"lilt is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely’ when it ’includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another."’ City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
338 (1994).
This Court has applied this reasoning repeatedly
in construing statutes, including in cases where the
question relates to the agency’s authority to compare
costs with benefits (American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 510) or even to
consider costs at all (Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.
246, 257 n.5 (1976)). Of particular relevance, the Court
did so most recently in Whitman v. American Trucking,
in determining whether Congress intended to authorize
EPA to consider compliance costs in establishing air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act. The Court
"refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the
Clean Air Act an authorization to consider costs that
has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted."
531 U.S. at 467. The same reasoning applies here. See
531 U.S. at 468-69 ("The implausibility of Congress’s
leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed (and thus
’delegating’ its resolution to the administering agency)
is assuredly one of the factors to be considered in
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determining whether there is ambiguity.").
b. Nor is there any tension between relying on
Section 316(b)’s plain meaning and Chevron. A statute
is not "silent" for Chevron purposes whenever the
statutory language does not expressly address the
precise legal question at issue. The Clean Air Act in
American Trucking did not have to provide expressly
that EPA could not consider costs in establishing
national ambient air quality standards for the Act to
have a plain meaning. Nor did the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in City of Chicago v.
EnvironmentalDefense _Fundhave to provide expressly
that a particular ash residue was not exempt from
hazardous waste regulation for that Act to have a plain
meaning. In light of the statutory language and
structure, the absence of an express exemption was
what mattered. 511 U.S. at 334-35. The same is true
here.
C. EPA’s Implementation of Section 316(b) Does Not
Defeat Its Plain Meaning
1. Petitioners claim that the lower court’s plain
meaning interpretation cannot be squared with EPA’s
interpretation of Section 316(b) over the last thirty
years. See U.S. Br. 27, UWAG Br. 15, 37, 41. They are
mistaken. Contrary to their characterization of EPA’s
past practice, until the rulemaking at issue in this case,
EPA did not claim the authority to inject a wide-ranging
cost-benefit analysis into standard setting under Section
316(b),~ Indeed, EPA had denied, rather than claimed,
such authority, and its current rulemaking finds no
historical precedent.
When EPA first faced the question presented in
this case in the original 1976 rulemaking designed to
implement Section 316(b), it flatly rejected industry’s
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claim that cost-benefit analysis was required (see 41
Fed. Reg. 17388) and, even more important, did not
leave any room for petitioners’ claim that the Agency
was addressing only whether such analysis was
"required" rather than "permitted." See UWAG Br. 38-
39. EPA then explained that cost-benefit analysis was
not appropriate because "It]he statute direct~ the
Agency to insure that enumerated aspects of cooling
water intake structures reflect the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact." 41 Fed. Reg. 17388 (emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, "[o]nce such adverse effects have been
identified * * *, then the effort m u~t be to select the
most effective means of minimizing (~’. e., ’reducing to the
smallest possible amount or degree’) those adverse
effects." Id. (emphasis supplied). See J.A. 41.
To be sure, in the years between the judicial
rejection of EPA’s initial rulemaking and the Agency’s
promulgation of the rules challenged here, EPA did
claim that the Clean Water Act allowed permitting
agencies in individual permit proceedings to apply a
"wholly disproportionate" test in fashioning
requirements applicable to a particular cooling water
intake structure. See, ~.g., U.S. Br. 5, 27-28. We do not
read this past Agency administrative practice as
supporting EPA’s now far more expansive claim of cost-
benefit analysis authority under Section 316(b) or as
necessarily inconsistent with our own view of Section
316(b)’s plain meaning.
a. As conceded by the Solicitor General, EPA’s
newly-claimed cost-benefit authority has a greater
"extent" and is "less stringent" than the narrow "wholly
disproportionate" test applied by EPA and state
agencies in individual permitting decisions. U.S. Br. 5,
27, 41 n.5. In no manner is EPA’s current claim of
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authority to engage in cost-benefit analysis under
Section 316(b) supported by 30 years of administrative
practice. U.S. Br. 27; Entergy Br. 23; UWAG Br. 37.
b. Moreover, the wholly disproportionate test is
not necessarily, in proper application, inconsistent with
Section 316(b)’s plain meaning- so long as it is applied
only when the cost is considered "wholly
disproportionate" because there are only de m~’m’mis
environmental benefits to be gained by the further
expenditures. In that circumstance, Section 316(b)’s
plain meaning would be satisfied because EPA could
reasonably conclude that the "adverse environmental
impact" had already been minimized. See pp. 29-30,
supra. Indeed, that is all EPA did in the permitting
decision in Seaeos~t Anti-PollutiOn League v. Co~tle,
597 F.2d 306, 311 (1st Cir. 1979), on which petitioners
and their amici repeatedly rely. See UWAG Br. 41; U.S.
Br. 27; Entergy Br. 57 n.25.22 There, EPA concluded
that a huge increase in cost was not warranted by an
insubstantial additional reduction in adverse
environmental impact on juvenile smelt or flounder
larvae. 597 F.2d at 309-311. Such reasoning is no
different from the Second Circuit’s ruling below that
Section 316(b) permits EPA to decline to require the
expenditure of higher compliance costs when the
adverse environmental impact to be achieved is
"essentially the same" as that obtained by a lower cost
option. See Pet. App. 26a.
S:ignifieantly, EPA’s understanding that it lacked
authority to compare costs and benefits under Section
22 Contrary to industry petitioners’ claims, the First Circuit did not
uphold the "wholly disproportionate" test, nor was it asked to pass
on it, as the Solicitor General acknowledges. See U.S. Br. in Opp.
13.
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316(b) continued through its Phase I rulemaking, long
after its announcement of a wholly disproportionate
test. In that rulemaking, the Agency made clear that it
"ha[d] not selected the best technology available on a
cost-benefit basis," but on the basis of technological and
economic feasibility, an approach "analogous to the
economic achievability analysis it conducts for other
technology-based rules under sections 301 and 306 * *
¯ " 66 Fed. Reg. 65309 (2001). And, the site-specific
variance EPA included in the Phase I rule was based on
compliance costs "wholly out of proportion to the costs
EPA was considering in establishing the requirement at
issue" and therefore was a eoBt-eo~tvariance, not a eo~t-
benefit variance. 40 C.F.R. § 125.85.
2. In all events, even if EPA had in the past
applied a "wholly disproportionate" analysis more
broadly, any such practice would have no significant
bearing on the resolution of this case. The first reason
is that EPA was not in any of those individual
permitting proceedings interpreting Section 316(b) in a
manner, such as a notice-and-comment rulemaking,
entitled to C]~ev~on deference. Since EPA’s initial
Section 316(b) regulation was struck down on
procedural grounds, EPA has merely been filling the
existing regulatory gap during permitting as provided
for by Section 402(a)(1)(B). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B).
The second reason is even more fundamental. In
no event can an agency administrative practice trump
a statute’s plain meaning. That is what this Court
meant when it said in Cl~evron that if the meaning of
the statutory language is plain, "that is the end of the
matter." 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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D. Resort to Legislative History Is Unnecessary
in this Case, but Its Examination Reinforces
Section 316(b)’s Plain Meaning
Given the statutory language’s plain meaning, as
buttressed by its structure and context, examination of
the legislative history is unnecessary. Only because
petitioners nonetheless purport co proffer some
legislative history in support of their claim, we offer
further discussion for those interested.
1. To support their claim, petitioners seize upon
an isolated floor statement by a single member of
Congress who describes the Section 316(b) standard in
terms of "practicability." Indeed, EPA in its rulemaking
effectively treats this statement as though its words
were the statutory language. Pet. App. 252a. In no
event can this statement support the weight petitioners
claim.
Whatever one thinks of legislative history, it can
never ,~dd words to the statute, let alone significant
ones. But, that is precisely what petitioners seek to do.
They want to add to Section 316(b) the word
"practicable," which nowhere appears in the statutory
provision. And, then, once added, they want to claim
that this same word is of enormous substantive import.
2. A more in-depth examination of Section 316(b)’s
historical origins, moreover, leaves no doubt that
Congress intended the meaning that is plain on the face
of the statute. As described above (see pp. 6-14, supra),
in drafting the statute in 1972, the legislators engaged
in intense and protracted debate on the extent to which
EPA should be authorized to consider costs and also to
relate costs to benefits in establishing environmental
protection standards. This dispute went to the core of
the legislative policy debate.
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a. The Senate and House initially had sharply
contrasting views on the issue, with the Senate favoring
a technology-based approach that denied EPA such
authority and the House favoring a water quality
approach that provided for such agency authority.
Following months of debate and precise drafting, the
two chambers finally reached agreement on a bill that
adopted the Senate approach in almost all significant
respects and, even then, had to override a veto triggered
by the President’s concerns about costs and benefits.
The formal legislative history, especially the
accompanying legislative reports, makes clear the
dramatic new direction that Congress ultimately
embraced. The legislators completely revamped the
federal water quality protection program in every
significant respect, including its primary reliance on
application of water quality standards. See EPA y.
California State Water Resouree~ Control Board, 426
U.S. at 202. The less formal history, including the
numerous documents prepared by members of Congress
and committee staff leadership during the conference
proceedings - draft statutory language, memoranda,
and notes on meetings - tells the same story, only in
greater detail. See notes 6-8, supra.
The final legislative enactment rejected a series of
House proposals to confer on EPA the authority to
engage in a comparison of costs and benefits in
determining environmental protection standards.
Congress rejected providing EPA with such authority in
determining BAT (see p. 9, supra); in determining
whether BAT would even apply (id. at 9-10); in
determining BDT for new sources (id. at 10); and in
determining controls on thermal discharges (id. at 12-
13). Such a consistent manifestation of congressional
intent to refuse to enact language that would have
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provided EPA with general authority to compare costs
and benefits leaves no room for petitioners’ effort to read
such authority back into the statute by way of strained
and unnatural readings of the words of the law
Congress did pass.
b. Not surprisingly, the drafting history of Section
316(b) is in full accord. As previously described (see pp.
5-6, 12-13, supra), Congress became aware of the cooling
water intake issue at first because of its relationship to
the thermal discharge issue. Congress ultimately
decided to break the two apart into two distinct
subsections. But, although the House ultimately
prevailed in its effort to allow for a biologically-based
exception to the application of technology-based
requirements in Section 316(a) -"the pro [t] eetion and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of
shellfish, fish, and wildlife" (33 U.S.C. § 1326(a)) - the
compromise the conferees finally struck in the closing
days of the conference did not include a similar
exemption in Section 316(b), let alone the sweeping cost-
benefit comparison authority EPA now seeks to assert.
See note 8, supra. Instead, Section 316(b) demanded a
technology-based standard that would "minimiz[e]
adverse environmental impact" using "best technology
available" and, unlike Section 316(a), would not relax
that standard based on achievement of a statutorily-
prescribed biological standard. The final bill also
rejected the original House proposal for Section 316(a),
which would have broadly authorized EPA to consider
the "relative costs and benefits" of control options and to
exempt a source if the costs bore "no reasonable
relationship to the economic and social benefits." H.R.
11896, § 316(b)&(d), I Leg. I-[ist. 1044. Here too,
Congress displayed its determination to deny EPA
authority to engage in cost-benefit analysis - an intent
5O
wholly inconsistent with petitioners’ claim that
Congress delegated EPA such authority under Section
316(b).
E. This Court Must Respect the Policy Choice
Made by Congress
1. No less than in 1972, many today sharply
disagree about the use of cost-benefit analysis in the
establishment of environmental performance standards
and, relatedly, the wisdom of delegating to EPA the
authority to base those standards on its independent
weighing of costs and benefits. Some support such a
delegation (e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit
State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (2002));
others oppose (e.g., David M. Driesen, Distributing the
Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection:
The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Regul~toryReform, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2005);
Frank Aekerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the
Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553 (2002)); and some
propose a middle ground (e.g., Richard L. Revesz &
Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality - How
Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the
Environment and Our Health, 1-45 (2008); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Christopher H. Sehroeder, Beyond Cost-
Benel~it Analysis:,4 Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 433 (2008)).
2. But, as the Solicitor General acknowledges,
"[t]he question presented here is not whether or to what
extent cost benefit analysis is a good thing." U.S. Br. 14.
The only question before the Court is the strictly legal
question posed by this Court in granting the petition:
whether Congress authorized EPA in Section 316(b) to
compare costs and benefits in determining BTA. Unlike
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several of petitioners’ amici (e.g., American Enterprise
Institute, Pacific Legal Foundation), many of those who
advocate greater use of cost-benefit analysis also
apprehend the limits of the judicial function. They
recogni’,ze the essential difference between what they
believe the law should be and what the law is; they
acknowledge that Congress has in fact widely rejected
the view that cost-benefit analysis should be the central
touchstone in all environmental lawmaking; and they
understand the reasons for that congressional
determination, even if they disagree with it as a matter
of policy. See Hon. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the
Vicious’ Circle- Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 41-42
(1993) ("There are institutional reasons * * * why
Congress may wish to write legislation of this kind. * *
¯ * * Congress may distrust the Executive Branch to
carry out a more broadly worded instruction with
sufficient vigor."); see also id, at 57 (referring to "a
history of conflict arising out of what Congress saw as
an Executive Branch effort to curtail environmental
regulation"); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost"
Bene~’t Analysis and Relative PoB#ion, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 323, 331 (2001) ("Presidents and courts have
circumscribed authority; they must act consistently with
federal statutes, which often forbid cost-benefit
balanciLng. Consider, for example, * * * the Clean Water
Act * * *, which contain[s] provisions banning agencies
from balancing costs against benefits."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Which Risks First ~ 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 101,
134 (identifying BAT as one of the "most criticized
features" of the Clean Water Act because of the absence
of cost-benefit comparison authority); Eric A. Posner,
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1137, ].182 (2001) ("Agencies often provide implausible
estimates of costs and benefits, use different discount
rates and valuations across regulations, and even fail to
monetize or quantify all the relevant costs and
benefits."); see also Revesz & Livermore, Retaking
Rations]it~v, Buprs at 55-147 (detailing "eight fallacies"
of cost-benefit analysis).
3. Finally, the rulemaking at issue in this case
highlights the reasons why Congress decided against
authorizing EPA to strike its own cost-benefit balance
in determining BTA. See Economists Frank Ackerman,
et al. Amicus Br. 29-35; OMB Watch Amicus Br.. II.C.
In purporting to engage in cost-benefit analysis, EPA
assigned no dollar value to one of the most significant
impacts of regulating cooling water intake structures:
saving aquatic organisms that remain in the ecosystem.
EPA monetized only fish that could be caught and sold
commercially. Pet. App. 482a-485a. By its own
admission, the Agency gave no dollar value to 98.2
percent of organisms saved by its own Phase II rule, let
alone those greater numbers that might have been
saved by more demanding performance standards, not
because they lacked any value, but because it was too
difficult to determine a meaningful market value for
them. See id. at 499a. This is just one of the many
limitations in the cost-benefit comparison that EPA
performed in the Phase II rulemaking. See J.A. 21.1-244
(comment letter of Dr. Frank Ackerman).23
It was just because of these kinds of limitations in
the application of cost-benefit analysis to the aquatic
environment, which had plagued the pre-1972 law, that
23 Relatedly, several states complained about the enormous burden
that would be imposed on them, in their capacity as permitting
authorities, were they required to undertake the factfinding
necessary for cost-benefit comparisons. See J.A. 209-210, 252,257-
58, 270-71.
53
Congress made a different policy choice in favor of
technology-based performance standards such as BTA.
Many believe that Congress’s bold move in 1972 in
choosing the technology-based approach over the prior
water quality and cost-benefit balancing approach is the
major reason for much of the Clean Water Act’s success
during the past several decades. See Environmental
Law Professors Amicus Br. I.C. But here, too, it is
ultimately for Congress to decide which regulatory
techniques will be most effective in addressing the
nation’s environmental problems.
"The question * * * is not what a court thinks is
generally appropriate to the regulatory process; it is
what Congress intended for the~e regulations." E.I. du
-pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 138; see Aliv. Federal
Bureau’2 of_Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008) ("We are
not at ].iberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning
we deem more desirable. Instead, we must give effect to
the text Congress enacted * * *."). "All the policy
reasons in the world cannot justify reading a
substantive provision out of a statute." North Carolina
v. E_PA, 531 F.3d 896, 910 (D. C. Cir. 2008).24
24 Because the Second Circuit invalidated EPA’s rejection of closed-
cycle cooling and its proffered "suite of technologies" on a ground
entirely separate and independent from the single issue on which
this Court granted review - EPA’s authority to compare costs and
benefits - the lower court’s remand of those aspects of the
rulemaking will, in all events, be undisturbed by the Court’s
resolution of the question presented. The court’s threshold ruling
was the absence of any adequate EPA explanation of the
rulemaking’s basis. The court made clear that this was an
independent error: "EPA was required to explain its judgment and
the basis for it" (Pet. App. 35a); and "[t]he record evidence alone
here * * * is oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us ~o
determi~ae what the EPA relied upon in reaching its conclusion"
(id.). The court faulted EPA for failing to provide (1) a record that
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
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would permit a court "to discern * * * how the EPA determined
that the cost of closed-cycle cooling could not be reasonably borne
by the industry" (Pet. App. 33a); (2) an explanation of "its
statement that the suite of technologies ’approach[es]’ the
performance of closed-cycle cooling" (id.); and (3) an "adequate
comparison in the Rule’s proposal, the final Rule or its preamble,
or the EPA’s submissions to this Court of the effectiveness of
closed-cycle cooling and the group of technologies whose
effectiveness provided the basis for the Phase II Rule’s performance
standards" (id. at 33a-34a). An agency must at a minimum
"cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given
manner." See Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm,
463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). In all events, should this Court reverse on
the sole question presented, it should leave for the Second Circuit
the question of the impact, if any, on that court’s other rulings. As
described above, moreover, the Court should decline petitioners’
efforts to have this Court consider issues distinct from the question
presented, including the reasonableness of EPA’s ranges (see note
16, supra) and the need for site-specific BTA determinations (see
note 17, supra).
